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RECESS IS OVER: NARROWING THE PRESIDENTIAL RECESS 
APPOINTMENT POWER IN NLRB V. NOEL CANNING 
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during 
the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the 
End of their next Session.
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the Recess Appointments Clause
2
 (the Clause) has engendered 
substantial controversy in the legal and political world. In the case of NLRB v. 
Noel Canning,
3
 the Clause was the center of one of the United States Supreme 
Court’s most high profile cases in its October 2013 term. The case was of great 
interest to many, not only because it presented a matter of first impression to 
the Court on a constitutional issue, but also because it pitted a small company 
against the Executive Branch in a battle over presidential power. 
In Noel Canning, the Supreme Court held that certain recess appointments 
made by President Barack Obama in 2011 were invalid because the President 
had overstepped the power given to him under the Clause. In so doing, the 
Court upheld the judgments of most United States Circuit Courts of Appeal 
that had ruled on the issue. However, while the circuit courts took a narrow 
view of the President’s power to make recess appointments, the Supreme Court 
interpreted the Clause “practically” and took a broader view. The Court issued 
three holdings. First, “the Recess,” as used in the Clause, referred to Senate 
breaks occurring within single sessions of the Senate known as “intrasession” 
recesses, as well as to breaks occurring between two formal Senate sessions, 
known as “intersession” recesses. The Court held that in order to trigger the 
recess appointment power, however, the Senate break must be greater than ten 
days. Second, the Court held that “vacancies that may happen” included not 
only vacancies arising during a recess, but also vacancies arising while the 
Senate was still in session and continuing to exist into the recess. Third, the 
Court held that pro forma Senate sessions qualified as actual sessions of the 
Senate sufficient to prevent the chamber from going into a recess. 
This Note analyzes only the issue raised in the Court’s first holding—the 
meaning of the term “the Recess” as used in the Recess Appointments 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 2. Id. 
 3. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1168 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1167 
Clause—and argues that the term should only be interpreted to apply to 
intersession recesses. Since the recess appointments at issue were made during 
intrasession recesses, if the Court had held that the term “the Recess” refers to 
intersession recesses, it would not have had to decide the other two issues. 
Part I of the Note provides the background facts of the case. Part II sets 
forth the relevant precedent in the United States Circuit Courts and then 
discusses the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in Noel Canning as well 
as Justice Scalia’s concurrence. Finally, Part III provides an analysis of the 
Clause’s text and structure, and argues why the “practical” interpretation set 
down by the Court is inferior to the intersession interpretation. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Noel Canning’s tale begins with the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB or the Board). The National Labor Relations Act (the Act) states that 
the NLRB is to be comprised of five members, of whom three “constitute a 
quorum,” appointed by the President with the “advice and consent of the 
Senate.”
4
 In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that the Act required a quorum in 
order for the Board to issue binding rulings.
5
 
On December 17, 2011, the United States Senate had agreed by unanimous 
consent to conduct only short pro forma sessions every three days, with “no 
business” being conducted.
6
 On January 3, 2012—a day the Senate held a pro 
forma session—due to the expiration of a previous recess appointment, the 
Board had only two members.
7
 The next day, on January 4, President Obama 
purported to exercise his recess appointment power and argued that the Senate 
was in recess.
8
 In claiming the right to exercise this constitutional appointment 
power, the President appointed Sharon Block, Terence F. Flynn, and Richard 
Griffin to the three vacant spots on the Board.
9
 
In February, after the President’s appointments, the Board, with its newly 
appointed members, issued a ruling against a bottling company named Noel 
 
 4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(a)–(b) (2012). 
 5. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 676 (2010). 
 6. DAVID H. CARPENTER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42323, PRESIDENT OBAMA’S 
JANUARY 4, 2012, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: LEGAL ISSUES 2 (2012). 
 7. Id. at 1–2; Joint Brief for Petitioner Noel Canning and Movant-Intervenors Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America and the Coalition for a Democratic Workplace at 7, 
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1115) [hereinafter Joint Brief]. 
 8. Joint Brief, supra note 7, at 11–12. 
 9. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to 
Key Administration Posts (Jan. 4, 2012) [hereinafter White House Recess Appointments 
Announcement], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of fice/2012/01/04/president-
obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-posts. 
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Canning.
10
 The company then petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review.
11
 Citing 
the Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in New Process Steel,
12
 Noel Canning argued 
the Board lacked a quorum due to the fact that the three “recess” appointments 
were invalid because the Senate was never actually in recess when the 
President made the appointments,
13
 and, accordingly, the Board’s ruling itself 
was invalid.
14
 
II.  PRECEDENT AND THE NOEL CANNING OPINION 
A. Precedent 
Until recently, courts had provided very little judicial precedent involving 
the Recess Appointments Clause. The issue was a matter of first impression for 
the Supreme Court,
15
 and prior to the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Noel Canning, 
only a few cases involving the Clause had come before the United States 
Courts of Appeal.
16
 Of the three prior appellate cases, only one decided what 
constitutes a “recess.” In United States v. Allocco, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected a challenge by a criminal defendant to 
the authority of a district court judge who had been appointed during a Senate 
recess.
17
 In rejecting the challenge, the appeals court held that the Recess 
Appointments Clause gave the President the power to recess appoint federal 
judges and to fill vacancies that actually arose while the Senate was in session 
but continued to exist during a recess.
18
 Twenty-two years later in United 
States v. Woodley, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
also upheld the President’s power to recess appoint “judicial officers.”
19
 
 
 10. Joint Brief, supra note 7, at 13. The company was involved in a labor dispute with a 
local labor union. Id. 
 11. Id. at 14. 
 12. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010). 
 13. Joint Brief, supra note 7, at 15–16. 
 14. Id. at 16. 
 15. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014). 
 16. Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel on the Lawfulness of Recess 
Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 
Op. O.L.C. 8 (2012) [hereinafter OLC Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/olc/opinions/2012/01/31/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf. At least two lower courts have 
taken up the issue, however, and ruled that the President could make intrasession recess 
appointments. Id. 
 17. United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 705–06 (2d Cir. 1962). 
 18. Id. at 709–10, 712. 
 19. United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
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In the third case, Evans v. Stephens, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that “recess” extended to intrasession recesses.
20
 In 
Evans, the petitioner claimed that a judge appointed to the Eleventh Circuit 
lacked the authority to sit on the panel because he had been appointed by 
President George W. Bush during an intrasession recess.
21
 The petitioner 
argued, inter alia, that an intrasession recess does not qualify as a recess under 
the Clause.
22
 The court, however, found that an intrasession break fit the 
eighteenth century dictionary definition of “recess” and that “the text of the 
Constitution does not differentiate expressly between inter-and intrasession 
recesses for [the Clause].”
23
 It discounted the argument that the use of the word 
“the” in the phrase “the Recess” utilized in the Clause indicated that the Clause 
references a single recess at the end of the Senate’s session and found that the 
phrase could refer “to any one . . . of the Senate’s acts of recessing,” whether 
intrasession or intersession.
24
 The court also rejected the argument that the use 
of the word “adjournment” in three other clauses of the Constitution limits the 
use of “recess” to only an intersession break.
25
 Rather than “describing a block 
of time,” the court found that “adjournment” could describe the action of 
Congress taking a break.
26
 Finally, the court looked to traditional presidential 
practice and noted that presidents had made recess appointments during shorter 
intrasession breaks.
27
 The court ultimately held that “given the words of the 
Constitution and the history,” it was not persuaded “by the argument that the 
recess appointment power may only be used in an intersession . . . but not an 
intrasession recess.”
28
 
In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit then issued its opinion in Noel Canning and held that the Clause 
referred only to intersession recesses. In doing so, the D.C. Circuit issued a 
 
 20. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004). There were two dissents; 
however, neither one addressed the intersession versus intrasession issue. Id. at 1228 (Barkett, J., 
dissenting); id. at 1238 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 21. Id. at 1221–22 (majority opinion). 
 22. Id. at 1224. 
 23. Id. The court cited to a 1755 dictionary that defined “recess” “as ‘retirement; retreat; 
withdrawing; secession’ or ‘remission and suspension of any procedure.’” Id. 
 24. Id. at 1224–25. 
 25. Evans, 387 F.3d at 1225. 
 26. Id. The Eleventh Circuit also addressed the fact that in Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 
583 (1938), the Supreme Court suggested that “adjournment” signified a period over which a 
break is taken. The Eleventh Circuit found that even if applying this usage, “adjournment” would 
describe only an intersession break, while a “recess” could occur intrasession. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1225. The Eleventh Circuit also noted that in the past, “[t]welve Presidents have 
made more than 285 intrasession recess appointments.” Id. at 1226. 
 28. Id. 
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very broad ruling.
29
 In fact, in siding with Noel Canning, the court’s ruling 
went even further than the company had requested. While Noel Canning had 
requested the court to hold that intrasession breaks lasting less than three days 
did not constitute a “recess,” the court ruled that no intrasession breaks 
whatsoever constituted a “recess” under the Clause.
30
 Therefore, the court held 
that the appointments at issue were improper, thereby invalidating the ruling 
against Noel Canning because the Board lacked a quorum.
31
 In ruling that only 
intersession recess appointments were constitutional, the court was able to 
avoid the task of having to decide whether a pro forma session constituted an 
actual Senate session. 
In its ruling, the D.C. Circuit placed heavy reliance on the fact that the 
Framers used the definite article “the” in “the Recess”
32
 and claimed that its 
usage suggested the intersession interpretation.
33
 The court also argued that the 
intrasession interpretation did not fit with the structure and purpose of the 
Recess Appointments Clause.
34
 In its structural analysis, the D.C. Circuit 
pointed to an analysis of the Clause by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist 
67, which noted that a recess appointment is the “auxiliary method” of 
executive appointments.
35
 After discussing that analysis, the court argued that 
it does not make sense to extend the “auxiliary” method of appointment to an 
intrasession break.
36
 If it were so extended, argued the court, then the 
“auxiliary” recess appointment method could “swallow the ‘general’ route of 
advice and consent.”
37
 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit also discounted the presidential practice of 
intrasession recess appointments.
38
 It noted the lack of intrasession recess 
appointments in the first 150 years of the Republic and also refused to give 
weight to recent presidential practices. The court argued that such an absence 
of intrasession appointments in the Republic’s early years “‘suggests an 
assumed absence of [the] power’ to make such appointments.”
39
 
 
 29. John Elwood, DC Circuit Strikes Down President Obama’s Recess Appointments, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 25, 2013, 11:24 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/25/dc-circuit 
-strikes-down-president-obamas-recess-appointments/. 
 30. Joint Brief, supra note 7, at 29; Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 499, 506 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013). 
 31. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 506–07. 
 32. Id. at 500. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 501. 
 35. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 502–03. 
 36. Id. at 503. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 502. 
 39. Id. 
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After holding that the Clause applies only to intersession recesses, the D.C. 
Circuit also held that the recess appointment power applies only to vacancies 
that actually come into existence during an intersession recess.
40
 However, as 
Judge Griffith noted in his concurrence, the court did not need to decide this 
second matter since the first issue was dispositive.
41
 
A few months after the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Noel Canning, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued its own ruling on the 
Recess Appointments Clause in NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and 
Rehabilitation.
42
 Like the D.C. Circuit, in New Vista, the Third Circuit held 
that “the Recess” referred only to intersession breaks.
43
 In New Vista, the 
Obama Administration (the Administration) argued heavily for a standard 
advocated by Attorney General Harry Daugherty for determining when the 
Senate is unavailable, and therefore, when the President may exercise his 
recess appointment power.
44
 The Administration argued that the standard 
allowed appointments during short intrasession breaks.
45
 However, the court 
was unpersuaded that Daugherty’s standard was the proper one to use. The 
court found that an examination of Founding Era state constitutions with 
similar clauses suggested that the United States Constitution’s Recess 
Appointments Clause applied to only either intersession or long intrasession 
breaks.
46
 Additionally, the court reached the same conclusion when it looked to 
the context of the Recess Appointments Clause within the scheme of the 
separation of powers.
47
 The court found that using the Daugherty standard to 
determine when the Senate was in recess would “eviscerate the divided-powers 
framework the two Appointments Clauses establish.”
48
 
After discarding the Daugherty standard, the Third Circuit then set its 
sights on determining whether “the Recess” referred to only intersession 
breaks, or whether it included long intrasession breaks. The court found that 
two aspects of the Clause demonstrated that it referred only to intersession 
breaks. First, the court noted that there was no link between “the Recess” and a 
 
 40. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 503, 506. 
 41. Id. at 515 (Griffith, J., concurring) (“The majority acknowledges that our holding on 
intrasession recess appointments is sufficient to vacate the Board’s order . . . and I would stop our 
constitutional analysis there.”). 
 42. NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 43. Id. at 208. 
 44. Under Attorney General Daugherty’s standard, the Senate is in recess when it adjourns 
such that (1) Senators “owe no duty of attendance”; (2) the chamber is empty; and (3) the Senate 
cannot “receive communications from the President or participate as a body in making 
appointments.” Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 29, Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 
F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1153). 
 45. New Vista, 719 F.3d at 220. 
 46. Id. at 226. 
 47. Id. at 242. 
 48. Id. at 230. 
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particular length of time.
49
 The court rejected any link with the Adjournment 
Clause
50
—which requires either chamber of Congress to get the other’s 
consent before adjourning for more than three days—and noted that there was 
“no constitutional basis for any sort of durational limit on what constitutes ‘the 
Recess.’”
51
 Second, the Third Circuit found the Clause’s provision requiring 
that recess-appointed officers’ terms expire at the end of the next Senate 
session suggested that the Clause applied to only intersession recesses. It noted 
that there was common agreement that a Senate “session” begins with the first 
convening of the Senate and ends when the Senate adjourns sine dine or when 
its term automatically expires on January 3 of any year.
52
 The court found that 
the Clause’s requirement that recess-appointed officers’ terms expire at the end 
of the next Senate session suggested that their appointments were understood 
to be made between separate Senate sessions.
53
 
Finally, in holding that “the Recess” refers only to intersession breaks, the 
Third Circuit discarded the Administration’s arguments regarding historical 
executive practice. The court found that for the first 100 years after the 
framing, “recess” was generally understood to mean only intersession breaks.
54
 
In examining the historical practice of presidents, it found that the use of the 
recess appointment power during intrasession breaks was a relatively recent 
development, and that such a use of the power was in the sole interest of the 
President.
55
 The court found that such a recent practice was not worthy of 
deference by the Judiciary.
56
 
The last United States Circuit Court of Appeal to decide the meaning of 
“the Recess” before the United States Supreme Court took up the issue, was 
the Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. Enterprise Leasing Co. Southeast.
57
 Here, again, 
the Administration argued for an “open for business” standard of determining 
when the Senate is in recess,
58
 but like the circuit courts deciding Noel 
Canning and New Vista, the Enterprise Leasing court held that the President 
was limited to making recess appointments only during intersession recesses.
59
 
The Fourth Circuit placed importance on the fact that the Framers used the 
word “recess” in the Clause rather than “adjourn” or “adjournment.”
60
 The 
 
 49. Id. at 233. 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. 
 51. New Vista, 719 F.3d at 234. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 239. 
 55. Id. 
 56. New Vista, 719 F.3d at 240–41. 
 57. NLRB v. Enter. Leasing Co. Se., 722 F.3d 609, 612–13 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 58. Id. at 647. 
 59. Id. at 652. 
 60. Id. at 654. 
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court found that each time the term “adjourn” or “adjournment” appears in the 
Constitution, it refers to an intrasession break.
61
 The court placed significance 
on the use of “recess” solely in the Recess Appointments, when the Framers 
could have used “adjourn” and found that this suggested that “the Recess” 
referred to intersession breaks.
62
 
The court also examined the context of the Clause within the time of the 
Framing. It noted the length of Congressional breaks during the time of the 
Constitution’s ratification was around six to nine months, wherein which time 
the Senate would be unable to perform its advice and consent function.
63
 The 
court found that this context indicated that the Clause referred to long breaks, 
and not short or weekend breaks, which would arguably be covered by the 
Administration’s standard.
64
 
In addition to finding that the historical record of presidential practice does 
not indicate an “intrasession meaning,” the Fourth Circuit found that the 
Administration’s standard offered little guidance to the President in 
determining when the Senate was in recess.
65
 The court indicated that the 
separation of powers demands clarity in determining when the Senate is in 
recess, and that drawing a line between intersession and intrasession breaks 
better provides such clarity than the “unavailable-for-business” standard.
66
 
B. The United States Supreme Court’s Opinion in Noel Canning 
Of the last three circuit court cases pertaining to the Recess Appointments 
Clause, Noel Canning was the first one appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court. When the Court issued its opinion in June 2014, it upheld the Noel 
Canning, New Vista, and Enterprise Leasing courts’ judgments that the 
President’s January 2011 recess appointments were invalid, but it provided a 
vastly different rationale. 
While the Court’s judgment was unanimous, only five justices joined 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion.
67
 Justice Scalia issued an opinion concurring 
in the judgment that Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito 
joined.
68
 
 
 61. Id. at 642. 
 62. Enter. Leasing, 722 F.3d at 648. 
 63. Id. at 649. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 650. 
 66. Id. at 651. 
 67. Jonathan H. Adler, All Nine Justices Reject Recess Appointments in Noel Canning Case, 
WASH. POST (June 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/20 
14/06/26/another-unanimous-opinion/. 
 68. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Justice Breyer began the majority opinion by stating that the Court 
considered three questions regarding the Recess Appointments Clause.
69
 The 
first was whether the Clause applied to solely intersession recesses or whether 
it included intrasession recesses as well.
70
 Breaking from the recent opinions of 
the courts of appeal, Breyer held that the Clause applies to both types of 
recesses.
71
 Second, the Court considered whether the words “vacancies that 
may happen” as found in the Clause refer solely to vacancies that come into 
existence during a recess, or whether vacancies occurring prior to a recess but 
still existing during the recess also qualify.
72
 The Court held that the Clause 
referred to both types.
73
 Finally, the Court had to determine how long a Senate 
recess must occur before the President may exercise his recess appointment 
power.
74
 In deciding this matter, the Court had to determine whether pro forma 
sessions qualify as actual sessions of the Senate, sufficient to keep the Senate 
from going into recess.
75
 Breyer and the majority held that such sessions do 
qualify as real sessions, and, therefore, the Senate was in the midst of a three-
day recess when President Obama made the appointments at issue.
76
 The 
majority held that three days was too short a time for the President to exercise 
his recess appointment power.
77
 Since the focus of this Note is on the meaning 
of the word “recess,” the summary of the Court’s opinion and Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence will focus mainly on that aspect of the respective opinions. 
Justice Breyer began the majority’s analysis by noting the Recess 
Appointments Clause’s role as a secondary method of appointment to the 
“norm” of the general appointments method; however, he also noted the 
“tension” between the President’s need for “the assistance of subordinates” 
with the Senate’s practice, in its early years, of meeting for a single brief 
session each year.
78
 With this framework established, interestingly, the Court 
indicated that it sought to “interpret the Clause as granting the President the 
power to make appointments during a recess but not offering the President the 
authority routinely to avoid the need for Senate confirmation.”
79
 
Justice Breyer began the Court’s analysis of the text by looking to 
founding era dictionary definitions of “recess,” which he found to include both 
 
 69. Id. at 2556 (majority opinion). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 2557. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2558–59 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79. Id. at 2559. 
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intersession and intrasession breaks.
80
 Additionally, by pointing to other areas 
of the Constitution using the definite article “the,” Breyer also discounted the 
notion that the Recess Appointments Clause’s use of “the” suggests it applies 
only to intersession recesses.
81
 Therefore, Justice Breyer found the Clause’s 
text ambiguous and then turned to executive practice where the Court placed 
“significant weight.”
82
 In fact, the Court used historical practice as its primary 
means of support in its ruling, and in doing so, noted its hesitation in upsetting 
the “working arrangements” that the Legislative and Executive branches had 
reached in regards to recess appointments.
83
 
In examining historical practice, the Court discounted the early lack of 
intrasession recess appointments, noting that the lack of intrasession breaks 
themselves would prevent intrasession appointments.
84
 It looked to nineteenth 
century opinions issued by United States attorneys general and other executive 
advisors and asserted that the available opinions of presidential legal advisors 
are essentially unanimous in taking the position that the Clause allows for 
intrasession appointments.
85
 The Court also placed weight on the fact that, 
when including military appointments, Presidents have made thousands of 
intrasession recess appointments.
86
 
The Court also looked at the Senate’s historical actions regarding the 
Clause. It found that to the extent that the Senate or a committee had expressed 
a view, the view “favored a functional definition of ‘recess,’” which includes 
intrasession recesses.
87
 The Court asserted that the Senate had not fought back 
against presidential uses of recess appointments during intrasession breaks for 
at least seventy-five years.
88
 
After providing its initial rationale as to its holding, the Court then set 
about attempting to refute three important arguments to the contrary. First, the 
Court tackled the assertion that the Framers intended the Clause to apply only 
to intersession breaks because they were hardly aware of intrasession 
recesses.
89
 Instead of intending the Clause to apply only to the type of recess 
they knew, the Founders, the Court claimed, knew that they were writing a 
document that was designed to apply to changing times.
90
 Taking a living 
constitutionalist view, the majority held that the Framers likely intended the 
 
 80. Id. at 2561. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 2559, 2561. 
 83. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560. 
 84. Id. at 2562. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 2563. 
 88. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2564. 
 89. Id. at 2564–65. 
 90. Id. at 2565. 
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Clause to apply to new circumstances that correspond with the purpose of the 
Clause and are consistent with its language.
91
 
The second argument the Court’s majority sought to refute was the 
assertion that the intrasession interpretation allows “the President to make 
‘illogic[ally]’ long recess appointments” due to the portion of the Clause 
allowing a recess appointee to serve until the end of the next Senate session.
92
 
The Court claimed that this provision of the Clause allows the President and 
the Senate to always have at least one full session with which to undertake a 
complete confirmation process.
93
 
Finally, the Court tackled the argument that its intrasession interpretation 
of the Clause would render the Clause vague. The Court responded, however, 
that vagueness was unavoidable and was arguably present no matter which 
interpretation one accepted.
94
 
After concluding that “recess” included intrasession breaks, in arguably a 
move of raw judicial power, the Court placed a floor on how long the Senate 
must not be in session in order to qualify as “the Recess of the Senate” under 
the Clause. Instead of looking to the three-day provision in the Adjournment 
Clause, the Court again looked to historical practice and indicated that it had 
not found even one example of a recess appointment made during an 
intrasession break shorter than ten days.
95
 Therefore, the Court held: 
[A] recess of more than 3 days but less than 10 days is presumptively too short 
to fall within the Clause. We add the word “presumptively” to leave open the 
possibility that some very unusual circumstance—a national catastrophe, for 
instance, that renders the Senate unavailable but calls for an urgent response—
could demand the exercise of the recess-appointment power during a shorter 
break.
96
 
As previously indicated, the Court also decided the issues of when a 
vacancy must come into being in order for it to be filled by a recess 
appointment and whether pro forma sessions of the Senate constitute actual 
sessions sufficient to prevent the Senate from going into recess. In regards to 
the former issue, the Court found the text ambiguous and, again, relying on 
historical practice, concluded that the Clause includes vacancies coming into 
existence while the Senate is in session.
97
 In deciding the latter issue, the Court 
deferred to the Senate’s determination of whether a pro forma session qualifies 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2565. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 2566–67. 
 96. Id. at 2567. “Political opposition in the Senate would not qualify as an unusual 
circumstance.” Id. 
 97. Id. at 2573. 
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as an actual Senate session. The Court refused to determine whether Senators 
were present on the floor of the chamber during particular pro forma sessions, 
finding that “[j]udicial efforts to engage in these kinds of inquiries would risk 
undue judicial interference with the functioning of the Legislative Branch.”
98
 
Since pro forma sessions qualify as actual sessions of the Senate and 
because the Senate had been convening pro forma every three days, at the time 
the President made the recess appointments at issue, the Senate was in the 
middle of only a three-day recess.
99
 Therefore, under the new ten-day standard 
established by the Court, three days was not enough to trigger the President’s 
recess appointment power, and the individuals in question were not validly 
appointed.
100
 
C. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence 
In response to Justice Breyer’s majority opinion, Justice Scalia penned a 
concurrence that reads more like a dissent. Scalia agreed only with the 
judgment of the Court and took great issue with its rationale. Scalia would find 
that “the Recess” includes only breaks occurring between separate formal 
sessions of the Senate.
101
 
Justice Scalia began his concurrence by pointing out the importance of the 
constitutional scheme of separation of powers. He argued that the 
Constitution’s structural provisions are just as important as the Bill of Rights in 
protecting individual rights.
102
 Justice Scalia asserted the Court, therefore, has 
an important duty to preserve the structural separation established by the 
Constitution and that it should not “defer to the other branches’ resolution of 
such controversies,” nor acquiesce in an encroachment by one branch upon the 
other simply because the encroached-upon branch approves.
103
 
Justice Scalia’s analysis began with an examination of the plain meaning 
of the text of the Clause. He noted that the Clause uses “recess” in 
contradistinction with “session.”
104
 Since neither the Administration nor the 
majority opinion argued that “session” has colloquial meaning, it is taken that 
it means a formal session.
105
 Therefore, “the Recess” must refer to the break 
between formal sessions, i.e., an intersession recess.
106
 Further, Justice Scalia 
 
 98. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2576. 
 99. Id. at 2573–74. 
 100. Id. at 2574. 
 101. Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia also would have held that vacancies 
that “may happen during the Recess of the Senate” refers only to vacancies that come into being 
during an intersession recess. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2593 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 104. Id. at 2595. 
 105. Id. at 2596. 
 106. Id. 
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noted the Clause’s use of the word “recess” as opposed to the word “adjourn” 
and asserted that the provisions of the Constitution using “adjourn” referred to 
intrasession breaks.
107
 Since the Framers used a different term in the Clause, 
they, therefore, must not have been referring to intrasession breaks.
108
 
Justice Scalia argued that through its rationale, the majority was attempting 
to ensure a “prominent role for the recess-appointment power in an era when 
its influence is far more pernicious than beneficial.”
109
 He asserted that the 
need for the Clause no longer existed, and that its use now is mainly relegated 
to allowing the President to circumvent the Senate’s advice and consent 
function.
110
 
A significant amount of Justice Scalia’s concurrence was also spent 
refuting the majority’s reliance upon historical practice. Justice Scalia 
acknowledged that a widespread and unchallenged practice occurring from the 
early days of the Republic should guide the Court’s interpretation of a 
constitutional provision that is ambiguous.
111
 However, “past practice does not, 
by itself, create power.”
112
 Regardless, Justice Scalia argued the history does 
not support the interpretation set forth by the majority. 
Upon meticulously going through the relevant history, Justice Scalia 
concluded that roughly ninety percent of intrasession recess appointments were 
made since 1945.
113
 Further, he pointed out that the first attorney general 
opinion on the matter, by Attorney General Philander Knox, expressly 
indicated that the President could make recess appointments only during 
intersession breaks of the Senate, and it was not until 1921 before a 
presidential legal adviser would embrace the majority’s interpretation of “the 
Recess.”
114
 Justice Scalia also noted that the increased number of intrasession 
recess appointments in the twentieth century elicited bi-partisan criticism from 
numerous senators, including amicus curiae briefs filed in recent cases from 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Senator Mitch McConnell.
115
 Justice Scalia 
summed-up the meaning of this history quite succinctly: 
Intrasession recess appointments were virtually unheard of for the first 130 
years of the Republic, were deemed unconstitutional by the first Attorney 
General to address them, were not openly defended by the Executive until 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2596 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 2598. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 2594. Justice Scalia argued that the text was not ambiguous in the first place. Id. at 
2600. 
 112. Id. at 2594. 
 113. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2604 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 114. Id. at 2602–03. 
 115. Id. at 2604–05. 
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1921, were not made in significant numbers until after World War II, and have 
been repeatedly criticized as unconstitutional by Senators of both parties.
116
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
In analyzing the Supreme Court’s opinion, Professor Michael Rappaport’s 
three possible interpretations of “the Recess” are helpful.
117
 These three 
interpretations are: the intersession interpretation—where a recess appointment 
can only be made during the recess between two congressional sessions; the all 
intrasession recess (or all-recesses) interpretation—where “recess” includes all 
intrasession recesses irrespective of length; and the practical intrasession 
interpretation—where appointments may be made during intrasession recesses 
that are greater than a certain set length.
118
 
The opinions by the D.C. Circuit and Justice Scalia in the Noel Canning 
case and by the Third and Fourth Circuits in New Vista and Enterprise 
Leasing, all interpreted the Clause as having the intersession-only meaning. On 
the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit in Evans v. Stephens took the all-recesses 
view, and Justice Breyer’s majority opinion for the Supreme Court applied the 
practical interpretation. This Note sets out to demonstrate that those opinions 
taking the intersession-only view of the Clause have the proper interpretation. 
It does so by analyzing the text of the Clause, examining how the Clause fits 
within the Constitution’s structure of separation of powers, evaluating the 
relevant executive practice, and finally demonstrating the issues with the 
Supreme Court’s practical interpretation. 
A. Text 
When interpreting a provision of the Constitution, the proper place to 
begin is “with its text.”
119
 An examination of the Clause, within the context of 
both the time of its writing and the Constitution as a whole, demonstrates “the 
Recess” to have the intersession-only meaning. 
Before demonstrating the ways in which the Constitution’s text evidences 
that the Recess Appointments Clause holds the intersession-only meaning, it is 
first important to show the ways in which it does not so demonstrate, such as 
arguments regarding the definite article “the.” The D.C. Circuit, in its opinion 
in Noel Canning, placed great emphasis on the fact that the Recess 
Appointments Clause uses the definite article “the” in “the Recess” as opposed 
 
 116. Id. at 2605. 
 117. Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1547 (2005). 
 118. Id. 
 119. NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 221 (citing City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997)). 
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to “a” or “an.” This argument resembles one made by Michael Carrier.
120
 
Carrier argued that the use of the definite article “the” in the phrase “the 
Recess” as opposed to the indefinite article “a” indicates that the Clause is 
referring to the single intersession recess.
121
 He asserted that the use of “the” 
indicates “the singular form of Recess,” while “the use of [an] indefinite 
article . . . would not limit as explicitly the meaning of Recess to the 
intersession recess.”
122
 The argument is problematic, however, and is 
ultimately weakened when examined against other uses of the definite article 
“the” in similar contexts in the Constitution. For example, Article I, Section 3, 
Clause 5 discusses “the Absence of the Vice President” regarding the Senate’s 
choosing of a President pro tempore.
123
 Though the clause says “the Absence,” 
it does not make sense to suggest that it refers to “one absence per session or 
year.”
124
 Therefore, it is not wise to rely upon the use of the definite article 
“the” to determine whether “the Recess” includes intrasession breaks. 
Other textual and historical evidence, however, demonstrates that the 
Recess Appointments Clause refers only to intersession recesses. For instance, 
though Professor Rappaport, in his seminal article on the Clause, noted that the 
1828 edition of the Webster’s Dictionary defines “recess” as a “‘[r]emission or 
suspension of business or procedure,’” and noted that this definition could 
conform with the “all-recesses” interpretation, he argued that “recess” also has 
a more specialized meaning that is ultimately consistent with the intersession 
interpretation.
125
 He pointed to the power under English law known as 
“prorogation” that allowed a king to end a session for both houses of the 
English Parliament.
126
 In adapting English parliamentary practice to the new 
Congress, the Framers did away with monarchical prorogations, and, instead, 
gave the right to end sessions to the Houses of Congress.
127
 The Framers used 
the term “adjourn” to describe this power, and in a departure from English law, 
the use of “adjourn” in the Constitution describes both intersession and 
intrasession breaks.
128
 
 
 120. Michael A. Carrier, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess 
Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2204 (1994). 
 121. Id. at 2219. 
 122. Id. 
 123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. The full clause reads: “The Senate shall chuse their other 
Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall 
exercise the Office of the President of the United States.” Id. 
 124. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1561 n.225. 
 125. Id. at 1550 & n.191. 
 126. Id. at 1550–51. 
 127. Id. at 1551 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4). 
 128. Id. at 1551 n.198. 
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The words of a constitutional provision should be read in the context of the 
entire text,
129
 and an intratextual
130
 analysis of the five clauses, which use the 
term “adjournment” compared to the use of “recess” in the Recess 
Appointments Clause, demonstrates the words to have the all-recesses and 
intersession-only meanings, respectfully. Professor Rappaport demonstrated 
that these constitutional provisions using “adjournment” “exhibit[] a pattern,” 
indicating that the “all-recesses” meaning is implicated when “adjournment” is 
used.
131
 He found that “adjournment” or “adjourn” in the Presentment 
Clause,
132
 Three-Day Adjournment Clause,
133
 Presidential Adjournment 
Clause,
134
 and the Orders Presentment Clause
135
 referred to the equivalent of 
both intersession and intrasession recesses.
136
 He also found that “adjourn” in 
the Day-to-Day Adjournment Clause
137
 refers to “extremely short intrasession 
recesses,” but could also possibly refer to an intersession recess.
138
 Therefore, 
the fact that the Recess Appointments Clause uses “recess” instead of 
“adjourn” is important because the use of differing terms within a legal text 
suggests differing meanings for those terms.
139
 Since the “all-recesses” 
 
 129. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 406 (1819) (asserting that, in constitutional 
interpretation, “a fair construction of the whole instrument” must be given); William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1532 (1998) (book review) (noting 
the “truism that interpreting a text requires context”). 
 130. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) (“In 
deploying [intratextualism], the interpreter tries to read a contested word or phrase that appears in 
the Constitution in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or a very 
similar) word or phrase.”). 
 131. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1557–59. 
 132. The relevant portion of the clause states: “If any Bill shall not be returned by the 
President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same 
shall be a Law in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment 
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 133. “Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, 
adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall 
be sitting.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §5, cl. 4. 
 134. The relevant portion states that, “in case of Disagreement between [the two Houses], 
with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, [the President] may adjourn them to such Time as he 
shall think proper.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 135. The relevant portion provides: “Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the 
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question 
of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, 
cl. 3. 
 136. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1558–59. 
 137. The relevant part of the clause states: “[A] Majority of each [House of Congress] shall 
constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day.” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 138. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1559. 
 139. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 170 (2012) (explaining the cannon of the “Presumption of Consistent Usage”: “[a] word or 
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meaning is included in the Constitution’s use of “adjournment,” then “recess” 
must have either the intersession or the practical meaning.
140
 However, “the 
closer the practical interpretation is to the all-recesses interpretation, the less 
support the pattern provides to the practical interpretation.”
141
 In other words, 
under the practical interpretation, the fewer the minimum number of days (or 
amount of time) that the Senate would be required to be in an intrasession 
break in order for it to be in a “recess,” the “less reason for the Framers to have 
gone to the trouble of distinguishing between recesses and adjournments.”
142
 
This fact, therefore, suggests that the intersession interpretation, and not the 
“all-recesses” or a practical interpretation, like the one adopted by the Supreme 
Court, is the more logical interpretation of “recess.”
143
 
B. The Clause and the Structure of Separation of Powers 
As Justice Scalia has argued repeatedly, the Constitution’s scheme of 
separation of powers is just as important, if not more important, than the Bill of 
Rights in protecting individual liberty.
144
 The presidential appointments 
method is an important part of the separation of powers scheme and plays an 
important role in protecting the liberties of the people. The General 
Appointments Clause states that the President: 
[S]hall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law.
145
 
 
phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a material variation in terms 
suggests a variation in meaning.” (emphasis added)). 
 140. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1559–61. 
 141. Id. at 1561. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. Rappaport further backs up his assessment by pointing to the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780 and the New Hampshire Constitution of 1792, both of which used “recess” 
to refer to an intersession break. Id. at 1552. 
 144. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 710–11 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In making this argument, 
Justice Scalia frequently notes that to the Framers, “the Bill of Rights was an afterthought,” and 
that the structure of government is the best protector of liberty, asserting that “every tin-horn 
dictator in the world today has a bill of rights.” See, e.g., The National Press Club, The Kalb 
Report–Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Antonin Scalia, YOUTUBE (Apr. 17, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=z0utJAu_iG4. 
 145. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The same provision also allows Congress to “vest the 
Appointment . . . in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” 
Id. In regard to Noel Canning, in passing the National Labor Relations Act, Congress did not vest 
the appointment of members of the NLRB in the President alone or in any other body. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 153(a) (2012). 
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As explained by Alexander Hamilton, there are two main benefits of the 
Senate’s check on executive appointments: (1) The check leads to better 
individuals serving in the Executive Branch; and (2) it allows for more 
transparency in the process of selecting appointments and, therefore, more 
accountability. In The Federalist No. 76, Hamilton explained how Senate 
confirmation of executive appointments provides an incentive for the President 
to take care in appointing executive officials. He stated that Senate 
confirmation “would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the 
President, and would tend greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit 
characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal 
attachment, or from a view to popularity.”
146
 Hamilton argued that the 
“possibility of rejection would be a strong motive to care in proposing.”
147
 
Essentially, Hamilton argued that the fact that presidential appointments must 
pass Senate muster requires the President to be more thoughtful about his 
appointments. With the Senate scrutinizing nominees, appointments are more 
likely to be based on skill and merit as opposed to merely being the result of 
personal or political favors or familial relations. The scheme, therefore, leads 
to better nominees and better individuals working in the Executive Branch, 
and, in turn, a better-functioning government. 
In The Federalist No. 77, Hamilton also suggested that the requirement of 
Senate confirmation for executive appointments brings the process into the 
open and allows for more accountability. He argued that Senate confirmation 
allows for public scrutiny of the nominee and requires the Executive to set 
forth his rationale for appointing the individual.
148
 If the appointment were left 
to the Executive, or to a council of appointments within the Executive Branch, 
it would be unknown to the public whether the Executive was appointing the 
person because of his merit: 
Or whether he prostitutes that advantage to the advancement of persons, whose 
chief merit is their implicit devotion to his will, and to the support of a 
despicable and dangerous system of personal influence . . . .
149
 
These questions, under such a scheme, would “be the subjects of 
speculation and conjecture” among the public.
150
 Additionally, Hamilton 
argued that the Constitution’s appointments process allows for proper 
accountability. If a nomination is rejected because the nominee is unqualified 
or is an otherwise bad nomination, the blame falls squarely on the President.
151
 
 
 146. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 2003). 
 147. Id. at 464. 
 148. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 2003). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 467. 
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Likewise, if the Senate rejects a good nominee, it takes the blame.
152
 Finally, if 
the President nominates and the Senate confirms a bad appointment, both 
would, as Hamilton put it, “participate . . . in the opprobrium and disgrace.”
153
 
In order to examine the role of the Recess Appointments Clause within this 
scheme, and what it suggests as the proper interpretation of “the Recess,” it is 
instructive to again look to Hamilton and his early analysis of the Clause in 
The Federalist No. 67. In writing The Federalist No. 67, Hamilton was not 
discussing what the Clause means by “the Recess;” rather, his purpose was to 
refute the notion that the Recess Appointments Clause allowed the President to 
make appointments to vacant Senate seats during a Senate “recess.”
154
 The 
essay is important, however, due to the structural analysis Hamilton set forth. 
Hamilton gave several reasons why the Clause does not give the President 
the power to make appointments to vacant Senate seats. He attached 
importance to the relationship between the Recess Appointments and the 
General Appointments Clauses.
155
 Hamilton said that the recess appointment 
power is “nothing more than a supplement to the other.”
156
 Further, Hamilton 
asserted that the Recess Appointments Clause was intended “for the purpose of 
establishing an auxiliary method of appointment in cases, to which the general 
method was inadequate.”
157
 Hamilton continued, writing that: 
The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the President and Senate 
jointly, and can therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate; 
but as it would have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in 
session for the appointment of officers; and as vacancies might happen in their 
recess, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without delay, 
the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the President, singly, 
to make temporary appointments . . . .
158
 
In concluding his argument, Hamilton claimed that since the recess 
appointment power is a “supplement,” and is “auxiliary” to the general 
appointment power, then the scope of offices that the President can fill with a 
recess appointment is limited to the offices that the General Appointments 
Clause allows, and that clause does not allow for the filling of Senate 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 148, at 467. 
 154. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 411–12 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 2003). 
 155. Id. The General Appointments Clause states that the President “shall nominate, and by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
Law.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 154, at 411. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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vacancies.
159
 Though Hamilton did not provide an explanation of what 
constitutes a “recess” for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, The 
Federalist No. 67 provides an excellent structural analysis of the Clause. 
Having examined the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause within 
separation of powers as understood by the Founders, this purpose can be used 
to determine the meaning of the Clause. The Clause’s “auxiliary” nature drives 
the analysis. It does not make sense to extend the “auxiliary” method of 
appointment to an intrasession break and allow any vacancy to be filled during 
this time regardless of when the vacancy arose. Such an extension, as the D.C. 
Circuit found, could enable the “auxiliary” method of recess appointments to 
“swallow the ‘general’ route of advice and consent.”
160
 
Under the Supreme Court’s holding, however, the President is given an 
extraordinary amount of appointment power if he can make intrasession recess 
appointments to vacancies that come into being at any time regardless of 
whether the Senate is in session.
161
 Under this interpretation, if the President 
cannot get an appointment approved by the Senate, he need only wait until the 
Senate goes into one of its many intrasession breaks and then make a recess 
appointment. Such a situation occurred when President George W. Bush 
appointed John Bolton to the position of United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations. President Bush formally nominated Bolton, but when the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee refused to send the nomination to the 
floor for a full up or down vote, the President waited until Congress took an 
intrasession break and then appointed Bolton.
162
 This use of the Recess 
Appointments Clause to circumvent the advice and consent function of the 
Senate does not conform with a power that is “auxiliary” in nature. The recess 
appointment power should be invoked “in cases to which the general 
method . . . [is] inadequate.”
163
 The general method is not failing in instances 
where the Senate is blocking an executive appointment. It is of course perfectly 
within the Senate’s purview to block presidential appointments. When the 
Senate does so, it is refusing to give its consent to the presidential appointment 
 
 159. Id. Hamilton further pointed out that, at that time, the Constitution required the state 
legislatures to make appointments to vacancies in the Senate, and that if a state legislature was in 
recess when a vacancy arose in the national Senate, then a temporary appointment was to be made 
by the state executive. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 superseded by U.S. CONST. 
amend. XVII; U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 2 superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 160. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 161. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1489–90. 
 162. Helene Cooper, Bolton to Leave Post as U.S. Envoy to United Nations, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 4, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/04/world/05boltoncnd.html; Elwood, supra 
note 29. 
 163. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 154, at 411. 
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as is allowed by the Constitution in its scheme of checks and balances.
164
 If the 
advice and consent requirement is to act as a real check upon the Executive, 
then it makes no sense for the President to be allowed to make intrasession 
recess appointments assuming he is not constrained by the time at which the 
vacancy was created. 
Finally, the context of the time in which the Constitution was adopted also 
demonstrates its “auxiliary” role. Since its inception, Congress has traditionally 
held one legislative session per year, with an intersession recess between the 
end of one session and the beginning of the next session the subsequent 
year.
165
 In the early days of the Republic, Congress held one legislative session 
lasting anywhere from three to six months, and then would adjourn into an 
intersession recess that would last from six to nine months.
166
 If an important 
pressing appointment needed to be made, due to the slow nature of 
transportation in those days, it could take a long time for Senators to 
reassemble to Washington, D.C. from their respective states. The long travel 
time, as well as the fact that most members of Congress had other jobs and 
duties to attend to in their home states, would have made it impractical to keep 
the Senate in constant session year-round. Therefore, the solution to this 
problem, as Hamilton indicated, is the scheme established by the Recess 
Appointments Clause: when the Senate is in recess, the President can make 
temporary appointments to posts that are otherwise subject to Senate approval. 
Justice Joseph Story supports Hamilton’s analysis. In his Commentaries on 
the Constitution, Justice Story says, in regards to the power given the President 
under the Clause: 
The propriety of this grant is so obvious, that it can require no elucidation. 
There was but one of two courses to be adopted; either, that the senate should 
be perpetually in session, in order to provide for the appointment of officers; 
or, that the president should be authorized to make temporary appointments 
during the recess, which should expire, when the senate should have had an 
opportunity to act on the subject. The former course would have been at once 
burthensome to the senate, and expensive to the public. The latter combines 
convenience, promptitude of action, and general security.
167
 
Therefore, as Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, the Recess 
Appointments Clause is largely an anachronism.
168
 It is a relic of the horse and 
buggy era and serves little use in the modern era of electronic communication 
 
 164. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (establishing that the President shall make 
appointments “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate”) (emphasis added). 
 165. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1500. 
 166. Id. at 1500–01. 
 167. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1551 (1833), available at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a2_2_2-3s58.html. 
 168. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2598 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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and air travel. Though it should not be written out of the Constitution,
169
 the 
text of the Clause should not be given a meaning it cannot naturally bear,
170
 
especially if such a reading is simply for the sake of keeping the Clause 
relevant. Even if one subscribes to the living constitutionalist interpretation of 
the Clause taken by the majority, what is the point of giving new meaning to a 
clause where “its only remaining use is the ignoble one of enabling the 
President to circumvent the Senate’s role in the appointment process”?
171
 
C. Executive Practice 
In issuing its ruling, the Supreme Court relied heavily upon executive 
practice. It is clear, however, that the practice of intrasession recesses is neither 
as longstanding nor as worthy of judicial deference as indicated by the Court. 
Presidents utilized the recess appointment power infrequently in the early 
days of the Republic, and the recess appointments that were made were 
intersession appointments.
172
 Prior to the Civil War, intrasession recesses of 
Congress were rare.
173
 The first intrasession recess appointments came in 1867 
under President Andrew Johnson.
174
 From the Civil War until World War I, 
President Calvin Coolidge made the only other intrasession recess 
appointments.
175
 However, Theodore Roosevelt caused controversy in 1903 
when, as President, he made appointments to vacancies during what Roosevelt 
termed a “constructive recess.”
176
 On December 7 of that year, the Senate 
ended a special session and then immediately convened into a regular 
session.
177
 Roosevelt argued “that a split second separated the two sessions,” 
which created a recess that enabled him to make recess appointments.
178
 The 
Senate Judiciary Committee subsequently issued a report rejecting Roosevelt’s 
assertion that a recess had occurred,
179
 but took no other retaliatory action.
180
 
In the modern era, Congress began taking more intrasession recesses, a 
pattern which produced more intrasession recess appointments by 
Presidents.
181
 This trend began in 1947 with President Harry S. Truman who 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2209–11 (1994); Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1572. 
 173. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1501. 
 174. Id. at 1572; OLC Memo, supra note 16, at 6. 
 175. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2212. 
 176. Id. at 2211. 
 177. Id. at 2212. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2212. 
 181. Id.; Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1501. 
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made twenty such appointments over four intrasession recesses.
182
 President 
Dwight Eisenhower made nine intrasession appointments; however, neither 
Presidents John F. Kennedy nor Lyndon Johnson made any.
183
 President 
Richard Nixon made eight intrasession appointments; President Gerald Ford 
made zero; and President Jimmy Carter made seventeen intrasession recess 
appointments.
184
 Presidents began using intrasession recess appointments in 
much greater number beginning with President Ronald Reagan. Reagan vastly 
increased the number of intrasession recess appointments compared to his 
predecessors by making roughly seventy intrasession appointments.
185
 Many of 
Reagan’s appointments were made in order to ensure the appointment of 
controversial nominees by avoiding the Senate’s advice and consent role.
186
 
President George H.W. Bush, though not wielding his recess appointment 
power as controversially as Reagan, made thirty-seven intrasession recess 
appointments.
187
 President Bill Clinton made fifty-three intrasession recess 
appointments;
188
 President George W. Bush made 141;
189
 and President 
Obama had made twenty-six intrasession recess appointments as of June 3, 
2013.
190
 
Likely in response to the large number of recess appointments made by 
President George W. Bush, in 2007 the Democratic Senate began utilizing 
short pro forma sessions during intrasession Senate breaks.
191
 Prior to that 
time, no president had made an intrasession recess appointment during a 
Senate break lasting less than ten days.
192
 Therefore, the idea was to use the 
pro forma sessions to divide long Senate breaks into breaks of only three or 
four days in an attempt to prevent the President from issuing recess 
 
 182. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2212–13. 
 183. Id. at 2213. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Carrier says that Reagan made seventy-three intrasession recess appointments, while the 
Congressional Research Service states the number is seventy-two. Id. at 2214; Memorandum, 
Cong. Research Serv., The Noel Canning Decision and Recess Appointments Made from 1981–
2013, at 4 (Feb. 4, 2013) [hereinafter CRS Noel Canning Memo], available at http://democrats.ed 
workforce.house.gov/sites/democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/files/documents/112/pdf/Recess% 
20Appointments%201981-2013.pdf. 
 186. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2214–15. 
 187. Id. at 2215. 
 188. CRS Noel Canning Memo, supra note 185. 
 189. HENRY B. HOGUE & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33310, RECESS 
APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, JANUARY 20, 2001–OCTOBER 31, 2008, 
at 3 (2008) [hereinafter CRS REPORT ON BUSH RECESS APPOINTMENTS]. 
 190. HENRY B. HOGUE & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42329, RECESS 
APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA 5 (2013). 
 191. Alex N. Kron, Note, The Constitutional Validity of Pro Forma Recess Appointments: A 
Bright-Line Test Using a Substance-over-Form Approach, 98 IOWA L. REV. 397, 405 (2012). 
 192. CARPENTER, supra note 6, at 15 n.97. 
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appointments; or, if an appointment was still made, at least make it the subject 
of “significant controversy.”
193
 Such pro forma sessions, typically, are very 
short—sometimes lasting only seconds— and require the presence of only one 
or two Senators.
194
 Unlike President Obama who has argued that the pro forma 
sessions do not limit his recess appointment power, President Bush did not 
attempt to make any recess appointments while the Senate utilized pro forma 
sessions.
195
 The Senate did not use pro forma sessions during President 
Obama’s first year in office, but began the practice again in 2010 and 
continued using such sessions through January 2012.
196
 At that time, the 
President went against the Senate and refused to acknowledge the pro forma 
sessions’ restraint on his recess appointment power.
197
 
The Supreme Court also looked to opinions of the Executive Branch over 
the years; however, the Executive has not been consistent in what it has viewed 
as constituting a “recess” under the Recess Appointments Clause. Early 
executive interpretations of the Clause found that the recess appointment 
power extended only to intersession recesses.
198
 For example, in 1901, 
Attorney General Philander Knox issued an opinion to President Theodore 
Roosevelt advising him against making an intrasession recess appointment.
199
 
Knox asserted that any temporary break within a regular session of the Senate 
was not a recess referred to by the Recess Appointments Clause.
200
 He argued 
that this prohibition against intrasession appointments extended even to long 
intrasession breaks, and that no discernible line could be derived from the 
Constitution sufficient to demonstrate how long an intrasession break must be 
in order for an appointment to be made.
201
 
The intersession-only view changed in 1921 with Attorney General Harry 
Daugherty, however. Daugherty took a practical view of what constitutes a 
Senate recess,
202
 and concluded that “the President is necessarily vested with a 
 
 193. Kron, supra note 191. 
 194. OLC Memo, supra note 16, at 2. Alex Kron described a pro forma session during 
George W. Bush’s Presidency: 
(1) Senator Jim Webb called the Senate to order; (2) the legislative clerk read a letter from 
Senator Robert Byrd, the President Pro Tempore, appointing Senator Webb as Acting 
President Pro Tempore for the session; and (3) Senator Webb announced that the Senate 
would adjourn on recess until the next pro forma session. 
Kron, supra note 191, at 406. 
 195. Kron, supra note 191, at 406. 
 196. Id. at 406–07. 
 197. Id. at 407. 
 198. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2233. 
 199. Id. at 2234. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Executive Power—Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 21–22 (1921) 
[hereinafter Daugherty Opinion]. 
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large, although not unlimited, discretion to determine when there is a real and 
genuine recess making it impossible for him to receive the advice and consent 
of the Senate.”
203
 Daugherty took the position that the recess appointment 
power extended to intrasession recesses; however, the power did not extend to 
short breaks.
204
 In fact, he maintained that even an adjournment for up to ten 
days would not “constitute the recess intended by the Constitution.”
205
 In 
Daugherty’s view no single bright line determined when the Senate is in 
recess.
206
 Rather, he adopted a standard from a Senate Judiciary Report: “Is the 
adjournment of such duration that the members of the Senate owe no duty of 
attendance? Is its chamber empty? Is the Senate absent so that it can not 
receive communications from the President or participate as a body in making 
appointments?”
207
 It is this standard which the Administration pointed to in 
support of its position in Noel Canning. 
Since the Executive’s adoption of the intrasession view of “the Recess,” 
the minimum number of days it has recognized for a Senate break to constitute 
a “recess” has grown smaller and smaller. In 1960, Acting Attorney General 
Lawrence Walsh
208
 found that a thirty-six-day break was sufficient;
209
 
however, in 1992, the Office of Legal Counsel suggested that an eighteen-day 
break was sufficient.
210
 President George W. Bush made recess appointments 
during intrasession breaks lasting as few as ten days.
211
 In January 2012, in 
accordance with President Obama’s controversial recess appointments, the 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued a memo recognizing the ability of the 
President to make recess appointments during intrasession breaks of the Senate 
lasting twenty days.
212
 However, the OLC also argued that pro forma sessions 
of the Senate do not qualify as actual Senate sessions that interrupt an extended 
Senate break.
213
 Therefore, the OLC found, the President could “conclude that 
the Senate is unavailable for the overall duration of the recess” even while the 
Senate is holding pro forma sessions.
214
 
 
 203. Id. at 25. 
 204. Id. at 24–25. 
 205. Id. at 25. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Daugherty Opinion, supra note 202, at 25. 
 208. William Rogers was the United States Attorney General in 1960; however, the recess 
appointments opinion was signed under Lawrence Walsh as Acting Attorney General. William 
Pierce Rogers, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/rogers-william-pierce (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2015); Recess Appointments, 41 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 463, 480 (1960). 
 209. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2236. 
 210. Id. at 2238. 
 211. CRS REPORT ON BUSH RECESS APPOINTMENTS, supra note 189, at 7. 
 212. OLC Memo, supra note 16, at 9. 
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Though the OLC expressly asserted that the President may make recess 
appointments during a twenty-day intrasession Senate break, the practical 
implications of the memo, if adopted, would arguably allow the President to 
make appointments during a Senate break of any length. If the Executive is 
permitted to choose what sessions of the Senate it finds sufficient to constitute 
actual sessions that prevent the Senate from going into a “recess,” then 
ultimately the Executive is determining unilaterally when the Senate is in a 
“recess.”
215
 Arguably, the President could then recognize short adjournments 
such as lunch and weekend breaks.
216
 
In sum, the practice of intrasession recess appointments, though first used 
in the nineteenth century, developed into consistent use more recently, and 
only the last few Presidents have used the practice with any regularity. This 
history shows that the traditional view by the Executive on what constitutes a 
“Recess of the Senate” has been “all over the place.”
217
 
History demonstrates that intrasession recesses were very rare in the early 
years of the Republic,
218
 and, therefore, early presidents would not have had 
many opportunities to test the constitutional waters and make intrasession 
recess appointments. On the other hand, the argument can be made that the 
lack of intrasession breaks in the first place suggests the Recess Appointments 
Clause was never understood to apply to such breaks. Therefore, the argument 
regarding early tradition is inconclusive at best. 
Regardless, the use of intrasession recess appointments is a recent practice. 
As Justice Scalia noted, of all intrasession recess appointments made, ninety 
percent were made since 1945. Even then, intrasession recess appointments 
arguably were not consistently made until under President Reagan.
219
 
Therefore, the practice is not a longstanding “systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice . . . [that] may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power,’”
220
 and, thus 
entitled to great deference. Rather, given the implications of the Clause’s text 
and structure, the nature of such recent presidential practices is not sufficient to 
discard the intersession interpretation. 
Further, the Executive has a self-interest in securing as broad a recess 
appointment power as possible. Therefore, the opinions of executive advisors 
and the historical practice should certainly be given less weight than the textual 
 
 215. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 504 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 
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and structural aspects of the Clause, which suggest the clause holds the 
intersession-only meaning. 
D. The Practical Interpretation 
The Supreme Court ultimately adopted a practical interpretation of “the 
Recess,” holding a Senate break of less than three days was not long enough to 
trigger the Clause, and a break shorter than ten days was presumptively too 
short. In so holding, the Court examined two possible standards, which 
included Attorney General Daugherty’s standard and the three-day standard 
derived from the Adjournment Clause. The former standard is unworkable, 
while the latter is without a basis in the Constitution. 
In Noel Canning, the Board asked the court to adopt the standard set forth 
by Attorney General Daugherty in determining whether the Senate was in 
recess. Under this standard, the Senate is in recess when it adjourns such that 
(1) Senators “owe no duty of attendance”; (2) the chamber is empty; and (3) 
the Senate cannot “receive communications from the President or participate as 
a body in making appointments.” The court, however, rejected this test. 
When the D.C. Circuit examined the test, it found that the vagueness of the 
Daugherty standard “counsel[ed] against” its adoption,
221
 and that courts “must 
‘establish high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague 
distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch 
conflict.’”
222
 
The Daugherty standard is so vague that, as Professor Rappaport pointed 
out, the features used to determine whether the Senate is in recess, in reality, 
“do not operate to clarify when there is a recess.”
223
 The standard operates 
under the assumption that when the Senate takes a recess, it completely shuts 
down.
224
 This assumption is wrong, even when the Senate takes a long 
break.
225
 During a recess, the Senate may hold committee meetings, which 
thereby create a duty of attendance for certain Senators.
226
 Not only can Senate 
committees meet during a recess, but since such a break does not affect the 
committees’ powers, they can also begin the confirmation process of 
presidential nominees during a recess.
227
 Further, during a Senate break, the 
Senate can also leave personnel who are available to receive communications 
from the President.
228
 In previous years, the Secretary of the Senate has been 
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 223. Rappaport, supra note 117, at 1554. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Carrier, supra note 120, at 2243. 
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given the authority to receive presidential messages, including nominations for 
appointments, during a recess.
229
 Therefore, the Court was correct to reject the 
Daugherty standard in Noel Canning, since the features it describes cannot be 
adequately ascribed to a Senate recess. 
The Court, however, looked to the Adjournment Clause in holding that any 
Senate break less than three days is without question too short to constitute a 
“recess.” The Court was mistaken to do so, however, since the two clauses 
serve different functions and, therefore, operate differently. 
The Adjournment Clause prevents one house from unilaterally taking a 
sustained break, which could prevent the passage of important legislation while 
Congress is in session.
230
 Therefore, the three-day provision, as part of the 
Adjournment Clause, makes sense: it allows one house to take a short break 
from business, while preventing that house from using the break to unilaterally 
hold up legislation. The Recess Appointments Clause, on the other hand, is an 
“auxiliary” method of appointment to be used when the Senate cannot fulfill its 
advice and consent role. Therefore, the two clauses have different purposes and 
appear to have little relation to one another. 
An examination of the practical implications of applying the three-day 
adjournment provision to the Recess Appointments Clause demonstrates 
further the unrelated nature of the two clauses. Under the three-day 
adjournment definition of “the Recess,” the President could make a recess 
appointment during any Senate break lasting longer than three days; however, 
this makes little practical sense. A floor of three days hardly seems a sufficient 
amount of time to warrant allowing the President to use the auxiliary method 
of appointment.
231
 Under this definition of “recess,” a break lasting three days 
and one minute would be sufficient for the President to exercise his recess 
appointment authority, and it seems unlikely that a situation would arise 
whereby a vacant position would need to be filled within such a short amount 
of time. This argument is likely one of the reasons the Court held that a break 
less than ten days, and not just three, was presumptively too short, barring 
some extenuating circumstances. This ten-day standard was based on executive 
practice and the fact that no prior President had made an intrasession 
appointment over an intrasession break of less than ten days. However, as 
previously discussed, a great deal of weight should not be placed on executive 
practice in this area, not only because it is recent, but also because the 
Executive has been “all over the place” in what it has traditionally viewed as 
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constituting a recess.
232
 Therefore, the Court would have no consistent 
executive view from which it could derive a standard.
233
 
Finally, the Court gives little guidance as to what constitutes an 
extenuating circumstance sufficient to overcome the ten-day presumption. 
Even if such a circumstance were to arise, whatever it may be, there are, in the 
event of most vacancies, laws and regulations in-place, which allow for 
temporary acting appointments for certain positions to essentially fill the 
vacancy.
234
 When a position becomes vacant for which Congress has provided 
an acting appointment, typically, a subordinate to that position fills the position 
in an acting capacity and assumes the position’s duties.
235
 Therefore, not only 
do the differing contexts of the two clauses suggest that they do not inform one 
another, but also, Congress has already acted to insure, in many instances, that 
the duties of vacant positions will still be carried out until an appointment is 
made. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the title of this Note should have a question mark added to the end. 
There is no doubt that the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Noel Canning significantly 
narrowed the presidential recess appointment power; however, when the 
Supreme Court issued its subsequent ruling, it took the scope of that power 
back to where it existed before the disputed appointments. Rather than truly 
narrowing the power, the Court found the furthest extent of the scope 
previously reached by a President, and told the Executive from there, “you 
shall not pass.”
236
 Nonetheless, Presidents had been pushing the envelope over 
the years as they began making recess appointments during smaller and smaller 
intrasession breaks, and it was only a matter of time before a President went 
too far, only to suffer some kind of rebuke.
237
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Only time will truly tell whether the Court’s ruling severely hampers the 
use of recess appointments to circumvent the Senate’s advice and consent 
function. It could be that the holding regarding pro forma sessions will allow 
the Senate to maintain an effective check on presidential appointments. The 
Constitution establishes a government of co-equal branches, and the legislative 
advice and consent function serves as a major check upon the Executive. This 
check is part of a structural scheme implemented by the Framers to protect the 
liberties of Americans. Though the Court may not have provided the best 
interpretation, the Noel Canning decision is important in that it prevents the 
President from effectively negating this check altogether. Such would have 
been the effect of the Administration’s standard, thereby expanding the power 
of the Executive at the expense of the Legislature. 
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